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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040174-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Perez-Avila was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel where 
trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence and where trial 
counsel failed to request merger of driving under the influence as a lesser included 
offense of automobile homicide? In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it 
is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance 
in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f25, 1 P.3d 546 (citations omitted). Where the 
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the 
issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Daniel Perez-Avila appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fifth District Court after being convicted on two counts of automobile homicide, second 
degree felonies, driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a third degree 
felony, two counts of child abuse, class A misdemeanors, and open alcoholic container in 
vehicle, a class C misdemeanor. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Daniel Perez-Avila was charged by second amended information filed in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court on or about November 12, 2002, with two counts of automobile 
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-207(2) 
(2002)1; driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44; two counts of child abuse, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-5-109(3 )(a) and 76-2-103; and 
open alcoholic container in vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44.20 (R. 31-32). 
On November 14, 2002, Perez-Avila was bound over for trial on all counts (R. 37-
38). 
On January 10,2003, Perez-Avila filed a motion to suppress, asserting that 
officers obtained incriminating statements from him without proper Miranda warnings 
(R. 60-61, 94-97). On March 7,2003, the State filed its opposition to the motion to 
suppress (R. 78-91). On June 2, 2003, the trial court denied the motion, finding that 
Perez-Avila was not "in custody" when he was interviewed (R. 105-112). 
On October 14,2003, the State filed a Motion in Limine, requesting that it be 
allowed to present evidence that Perez-Avila had been ordered to install an ignition 
interlock device in his vehicle, evidence that the device was installed and that Perez-
Avila circumvented the device's protective features, and evidence of two prior DUI 
convictions (R. 139-146). 
1
 § 76-5-207(2) is now codified as § 76-5-207(3). 
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A jury trial was held on October 20 and 21, 2003 (R. 228, 229). The jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on all counts (R. 170-73). 
On January 21,2004, Perez-Avila was sentenced to prison based on his 
convictions in the following manner: Count I automobile homicide: an indeterminate 
term of not less that one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; Count 
II automobile homicide: an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; and Count III driving under the influence: an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. Counts I and II are 
to run consecutive and count III is concurrent. Based on Perez-Avila's other convictions 
for Count IV child abuse and Count V child abuse, he was sentenced to a term of one 
year in jail for each count, each count to run consecutive (R. 204-06). 
On February 4, 2004, Perez-Avila filed pro-se a Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals (R. 209). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Shaine Dunkle 
On Sunday, May 26,2002, Shaine Dunkle had just woken up and was driving his 
semi tractor-trailer through Utah on his way to Los Angeles (R. 228: 56, 62). Just south 
of Cedar City on Interstate 15, Dunkle drove past a rest area and observed a Nissan 
frontier pickup in the rest area backup at a high rate of speed and then take off down the 
ramp (R. 228: 57). The Nissan came up behind Dunkle then passed him at a high rate of 
speed (R. 228: 57). A mile or two down the road, Dunkle saw the Nissan sitting on the 
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shoulder of the road (R. 228: 57). Dunkle passed the Nissan and then a few miles later 
the Nissan pulled beside Dunkle (R. 228: 57). Dunkle saw that a man was driving, a 
woman was sitting in the passenger seat, and two children were in the backseat (R. 228: 
59). None of the passengers were wearing seat belts and the two children in the back 
were standing and playing (R. 228: 61). Dunkle also saw that both the man and the 
woman had a can in-between their legs, but he could not tell what they were drinking (R. 
228: 71). 
The Nissan "was swaying back and forth" on the road (R. 228: 73). A few miles 
later, Dunkle then saw the Nissan go off the road on the right side and then the truck 
began rolling (R. 228: 58). As the Nissan rolled, Dunkle saw two children being ejected 
from the vehicle as well as a "whole lot of cans and stuff going flying everywhere" (R. 
228: 58). The other passengers were also ejected from the vehicle (R. 228: 59). Dunkle 
called 9-1-1 and went to help the two children that were on the road (R. 228: 60). Both 
the little girl and little boy had numerous lacerations and were bleeding badly (R. 228: 
60). 
Dunkle later saw "a whole lot of beer cans spread all over the place" (R. 228: 60). 
He also observed that the Nissan had a couple of flat tires, but he could not tell when they 
were flattened (R. 228: 76). 
Testimony of Stephanie Robinson 
Stephanie Robinson was working at gas station, Travel Centers America, in 
Parowan, Utah, on May 26,2002 (R. 228: 85). A Hispanic customer came in, attempting 
to pre-pay for gas, but the teller could not understand him due to a language barrier (R. 
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228: 85, 89, 92). Robinson thought he was driving a bronze, small Jeep-like pickup truck 
(R. 228: 86, 94). Robinson smelled alcohol on him and when he drove away, she called 
the police (R. 228: 86). She told the police the vehicle's license plate number, 720 XXJ, 
and informed them he was headed southbound (R. 228: 87, 89). Robinson identified the 
customer as the Defendant (R. 228: 90). 
Testimony of Deputy Robert Zubal 
On May 26, 2002, Robert Zubal was working for the Washington County Sheriffs 
Office and was called to a roll-over accident on Interstate 15 (R. 228: 98). Zubal was the 
first officer to arrive at the scene (R. 228: 98). He found Perez-Avila next to the truck, 
and saw Perez-Avila's wife in a ravine, but she was already deceased (R. 228: 98). 
Perez-Avila "appeared to be in very bad shape" (R. 228: 99). Zubal discovered that two 
children were also involved in the accident and they were in poor condition with "a lot of 
trauma" (R. 228:99). 
Zubal noticed the vehicle was a "light, maybe a brown or tan-ish" Nissan pickup 
truck and there were no car seats for children (R. 228: 100,101). The seat belts were 
fully retracted, meaning they had not been used (R. 228: 100). Zubal also saw five or six 
beer cans immediately around the truck; some of them were still full and some had been 
opened with a little beer remaining (R. 228: 106-08). 
Testimony of Gambrelli Layco 
Gambrelli Layco worked for the forensic toxicology lab of the Utah Department of 
Health in June of 2002 (R. 228:109). Layco tested samples of what she believed to be 
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Perez- Avila's blood and found that the blood alcohol level of the sample was .24 (R. 228: 
116, 119). 
Testimony of Dr. Edward Leis 
Edward Leis is the deputy chief medical examiner for the state of Utah (R. 228: 
126). Lies performed an autopsy on the body of Maria Perez Ortez (R. 228: 128). Leis 
noted that Mrs. Perez Ortez was 16 weeks pregnant at the time of her death, which was a 
result of the car accident (R. 228: 130, 131, 133). Leis also thought the fetus' death 
resulted from the death of the mother; however, he did not conduct an autopsy on the 
fetus to determine its cause of death (R. 228: 137, 139). Leis only observed the fetus 
externally and noted there were no congenital anomalies and no external sings of trauma 
(R. 228: 139). 
Leis conducted a variety of tests on the body of Perez Ortez and found no drugs or 
alcohol present (R. 228: 131). Leis also noted abrasions across Perez Ortez's chest that 
denotes she was probably wearing a seat belt (R. 228: 132,143). 
Testimony of Kevin Davis 
Kevin Davis is employed with the Utah Highway Patrol and was on duty on May 
26,2002 (R. 228: 150). Davis arrived at the scene of the accident about 15 minutes after 
it occurred and was the investigating officer (R. 228: 151,163). When Davis arrived, 
EMT people were already at work (R. 228:164). Davis went to the hospital where the 
injured were taken (R. 228: 159). When he arrived at the hospital, Shawn Hinton gave 
Davis the kit that allegedly contained Perez-Avila's blood (R. 228: 160). 
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Testimony of Sergeant James Lloyd 
James Lloyd works for the Utah Highway Patrol and was on duty on May 26, 
2002 (R. 228: 176). Lloyd checked some of the seatbelts in the truck and he thought they 
were working (R. 228: 181). 
The day after the accident, Lloyd went to an impound yard where the truck had 
been impounded to search the car in order to determine the identity of the deceased 
female (R. 228: 178-79). Lloyd found a diaper bag in the truck and in the diaper bag he 
discovered an I.D. card for Maria Cruz Ortez Perez, the deceased (R. 228: 178-79). 
Llyod also observed the interlock device (R. 228: 179). The interlock device was 
damaged in the accident, and part of it was in the back of the truck and part was in the 
front (R. 228: 179). Lloyd, with the help of Dale Kennet, removed the interlock device 
from the truck (R. 228: 179). 
Testimony of Sergeant Shawn Hinton 
Shawn Hinton works for the Utah Highway Patrol and on May 26, 2002, Sergeant 
James Lloyd asked him to go to the Dixie Regional Medical Center to "get a blood draw 
on the driver" (R. 228: 185-86). Lloyd told Hinton that he thought alcohol may be a 
factor in the accident (R. 228: 185). Hinton asked an E.R. nurse, Joanne Nielson, to draw 
blood from the driver of the truck (R. 228: 186). Perez-Avila was unconscious when the 
nurse drew the blood (R. 228:191). Hinton gave the nurse the standard kit and the nurse 
drew the blood from Perez-Avila and then gave the two vials of blood back to Hinton (R. 
228: 186-87). The nurse then signed the kit and Hinton later turned the kit over to 
Trooper Davis (R. 228:187-88). 
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Testimony of Annette Kennett 
In May and June of 2002, Annette Kennett owned Affordable Interlock and 
installed an ignition interlock device in Perez-Avila's vehicle (R. 229: 201). The serial 
number on the device installed in Perez-Avila's vehicle was S08975 (R. 229: 202). 
Kennett explained that the ignition interlock device prevents the vehicle from 
starting until the person blows into the sensor unit (R. 229: 204). The sensor unit tests for 
ethanol alcohol and if the person does not pass the test, the vehicle will not start (R. 229: 
204). The device also has random tests, which the person must blow into while driving 
or else the device will beep loudly until the person shuts off the vehicle (R. 228: 206-07). 
Kennett also explained that the device records when tests are given and whether 
the driver passed the tests (R. 228: 207). Kennett retrieved the memory chip from the 
ignition interlock device that was in Perez-Avila's vehicle and generated a report 
detailing when tests were conducted (R. 228: 207,210). The report stated that on May 
26,2002, every test taken on that day was taken and passed (R. 228: 210). The first test 
was given in the morning at 9:02 or 9:08, before the vehicle was started (R. 229: 212, 
213). The next test was at 9:14, and then two more tests were given randomly and then at 
10:16 the engine shut off(R. 229: 213). Then that afternoon, the vehicle was again 
driven and a series of tests were given and passed (R. 229: 214). 
Kennett testified that the only way to defeat the ignition interlock device was to 
either tamper with the wiring or have someone else take the test for the driver (R. 229: 
214). 
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Testimony of Teresa Barrientez 
Teresa Barrientez works for Auto Sense International, and on June 3, 2002, she 
examined interlock device S08975A to see if all parts were there and to see if it was 
properly functioning (R. 229: 218-19). Barrientez found that the unit was performing 
within specifications for a calibrated device and that it had not been tampered with (R. 
229: 221). Barrientez also testified that there is no way the device can turn a car off, even 
if it malfunctions (R. 229: 224). 
Testimony of Joanne Nielson 
Joanne Nielson is a registered nurse who works in the emergency room at Dixie 
Regional Medical Center (R. 229: 238). Nielson remembered drawing the blood from a 
male Hispanic while in the E.R. room #7 (R. 229: 241). Nielson identified Perez-Avila 
as the man she drew the blood from and then gave the blood in the kit to Hinton (R. 229: 
241-42). Nielson testified that Exhibit 11, a blood kit, contained her initials and the date 
and time the blood was drawn (R. 229: 239-40). 
Nielson thought that Perez-Avila was awake when she drew his blood, but she did 
not ask his consent, saying "I leave that up to the officers9' (R. 229: 243). Nielson also 
testified that the typical procedure she follows when drawing blood at the request of law 
enforcement is to fill out paperwork and use the kit the officers provide (R. 229: 239). 
Nielson made no mention of the officers ever having a search warrant (R. 229: 239). 
Testimony of Sergeant Martin Luther III 
Martin Luther works for the Salt Lake City police department and was assigned to 
visit Perez-Avila at the LDS Hospital in June 2002 (R. 229:259). Luther went to Perez-
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Avila's room and then a nurse asked if they wanted a private room to meet in (R. 229: 
260). Luther said that would be fine, so the nurse escorted them to a private room (R. 
229:261). 
Luther asked Perez-Avila that he wanted to talk about the crash and if he would 
speak with him (R. 229: 261). Perez-Avila consented and Luther recorded the 
conversation on a note pad (R. 229: 262). Luther had to refer to his typewritten notes to 
recall his interview of Perez-Avila (R. 229: 265). 
After a few initial questions lasting at least half an hour, Luther read Perez-Avila 
the Miranda warnings and Perez-Avila stated, "I have lost everything. I can't pay for an 
attorney so I guess I would ask for an attorney. Are you here to arrest me and take me to 
jail? I don't have anything" (R. 229: 270,271). Perez-Avila also stated, "I am so sorry 
for what has happened. I have nightmares. I can't remember what happened" (R. 229: 
271). Luther responded, "I'm not here to arrest you. I had questions I wanted to ask you 
that are related to possible criminal charges so I read you Miranda." (R. 229: 271). 
Perez-Avila then stated, "You want to ask if I was drinking?" (R. 229: 272). Luther said, 
"That would be one of my questions" (R. 229: 272). Perez-Avila then said, 
I had a beer. It takes an hour for an ounce of alcohol to go through my body. The 
machine doesn't let me drive if I've had too much. It checks me while I'm 
driving. You can get the computer chip out. And it shows when I've tested. I 
take it to them to be checked. I am so lonely here I want to see my kids. I want to 
help them live. Do you know where my truck is? 
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(R. 229: 272). Perez-Avila further told Luther to check the computer chip and then asked 
about money he had on the day of the accident, and Luther asked him, "How much 
money did you have?" (R. 229: 271). Perez-Avila responded, "I don't know exactly. But 
about $1,200. I got a 5,000 dollar loan a few weeks ago. Some money was left, so I told 
Maria Sunday, let's go to Palm Springs to see your brother. I don't know what happened. 
Maybe I was asleep. I was tired. We stopped. The kids got out to pee. I had a beer. We 
stopped a lot. It was a fun time." (R. 229: 273). 
Stipulation of Evidence 
Both sides stipulated that both children suffered serious physical injury (R. 229: 287). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Perez-Avila asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel 
at trial when trial counsel failed to move to suppress the warrantless blood draw evidence 
taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and for trial counsel failing to request 
the driving under the influence of alcohol charge be dismissed as it is a lesser included 
offense of automobile homicide. 
Perez-Avila's blood was taken without a search warrant and it is clear that there 
were no exigent circumstances justifying this warrantless procedure. Thus, Perez-Avila's 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence resulting from the illegal blood draw, Perez-Avila would not have been 
convicted with two counts of automobile homicide and driving under the influence. 
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Also, it is likely that he would not have been convicted with two counts of child abuse as 
those convictions hinged upon the automobile homicide convictions. 
Driving under the influence is also a lesser included offense of automobile 
homicide under the facts of this case, and had trial counsel requested that the DUI charge 
merge with automobile homicide, the DUI charge would have merged. 
Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress 
evidence and for failing to request the consolidation of the DUI charge. But for trial 
counsels deficient performance, Perez-Avila would have received a more favorable 
outcome at trial. Therefore, all charges, except the open container charge, should be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE 
TO SUPPRESS THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW AND FOR 
FAILING TO REQUEST MERGER OF THE DUI AND 
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE CHARGES 
Perez-Avila asserts that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because it was unsupported by exigent circumstances and that DUI is 
a lesser included offense of Automobile Homicide, thus violating the tenets of Double 
Jeopardy. Trial counsel's failure to move to suppress all evidence resulting from the 
warrantless blood draw and trial counsel's failure to request a merger of the charges 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, all evidence resulting 
from the illegal blood draw should be suppressed and the DUI conviction should be 
reversed. 
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In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, {^25, 1 P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah 1994)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the 
first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 
P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
A. There Were No Exigent Circumstances Justifying the Warrantless 
Blood Draw. 
"Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under both the state and federal 
constitutions." State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, % 8, 93 P.3d 854, cert granted 100 
P.3d 220 (Utah 2004) (quoting State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (Utah App. 
1991)). "However, the presumption against warrantless searches is not without its 
exceptions, which are '"jealously and carefully drawn."' One such exception to the 
warrant requirement recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and Utah's 
appellate courts is exigent circumstances." Id. (citations omitted). 
This Court recently addressed the precise issue of what circumstances justify a 
warrantless blood draw after an automobile accident in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 
198. This Court held: 
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"To justify a police officer's decision to extract blood without the benefit of a 
search warrant, the State bears the burden of showing that (1) the officer had 
probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in an alcohol-related 
offense; (2) the officer had reason to believe the blood sample would produce 
evidence of the defendant's level of intoxication when the crime was committed; 
(3) the officer reasonably believed that they were 'confronted with an emergency, 
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened "the destruction of the evidence,'"; and (4) the method used by the 
officer to obtain the blood sample was 'performed in a reasonable manner.'" 
Id. at If 9 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836-37, 
16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (citation omitted)). In Rodriguez, the defendant was with a friend 
and driving when she abruptly turned left into oncoming traffic, directly in front of a 
school bus. Id. at ^  2. The bus struck the passenger side of the car, throwing the car off 
the road and injuring both the defendant and her friend. Id. The accident occurred 
between 4:45 and 4:50 p.m. Id. The accident was immediately reported and the 
paramedics arrived on the scene at 4:50 p.m. Id. The defendant was in critical condition 
and was quickly transported to LDS Hospital. Id. The passenger had severe head injuries 
and the paramedics determined she was near death and likely to die, and she was 
transported to the University Hospital. Id. 
After the defendant was transported to the hospital, the first police officers arrived 
on the scene. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^  3. After looking for possible witnesses, a 
paramedic informed the officers that the occupants of defendant's car smelled of alcohol. 
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Id. The officers searched the car and discovered a partially empty bottle of vodka in the 
passenger's purse. Id. The supervising officer then arrived and was informed of the 
events surrounding the accident and immediately requested that dispatch send an officer 
to obtain a blood sample from the defendant. Id. 
At 5:10 p.m., dispatch instructed Officer Swensen to "witness a blood draw" from 
the defendant. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at If 4. Swensen went to the hospital and 
found the defendant on a CT table waiting for a CT scan. Id. Swensen noticed that the 
defendant was very uncooperative with the medical staff and that "her breath had a heavy 
odor of alcohol." Id. Swensen also noticed that the defendant's eyes were red and her 
speech was slurred. Id. 
Swensen waited twenty-five minutes for the blood technician to arrive and then 
Swensen informed the defendant that they "were going to draw blood from her just as we 
do in accidents." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at f 5. The technician drew blood from 
the defendant's IV line and the blood was labeled, stored, and eventually tested. Id. The 
test revealed that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was .39. Id. 
The passenger died and the defendant was charged with one count of automobile 
homicide. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at % 6. A motion to suppress any evidence 
derived from the warrantless blood draw was filed, but the trial court denied the motion. 
Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted of automobile homicide. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the State failed to demonstrate that the 
warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 
198, at f 10. The State asserted that the "U.S. Supreme Court and a majority of 
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jurisdictions have considered the issue and held that the evanescence of blood-alcohol 
evidence coupled with delays inherent in investigating an alcohol-related traffic accident 
constitutes exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment." Id. This Court 
recognized that some jurisdictions have interpreted Schmerber to create a per se rule, but 
this Court conclusively held that "the Schmerber language comports with accepted 
exigent circumstances doctrine" and this Court declined to adopt the per se rule 
advocated by the State. Id. This Court then held that "exigent circumstances will be 
found where the situation involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the 'totality of the 
circumstances/ supports a finding that the officer 'was confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the 
destruction of evidence.'" Id. at ^  14 (citations omitted). 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, this Court highlighted several factors 
that should be considered in "determining whether a situation created exigent 
circumstances sufficient to overcome the need for a search warrant." Rodriguez, 2004 UT 
App 198 at \ 16. The factors "include the distance to the nearest magistrate, the 
availability of a telephonic warrant, the feasibility of a stake-out while a warrant is being 
obtained, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related offense, the commission of 
another offense such as fleeing the scene, the ongoing and continuing nature of an 
investigation, the extent of probable cause, and the conduct of the investigating officers." 
Id. 
This Court observed that the decision to extract defendant's blood without a 
warrant was made twenty-five minutes after the accident occurred and at a time "'when 
17 
courts are open and search warrants can be readily requested' either in person or by 
telephone." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^  19 (citation omitted). Moreover, there was 
no attempt by any officer to obtain a warrant, nor did the State present evidence that 
anyone "assessed the difficulty and time required to obtain a proper search warrant." Id. 
Instead, "both officers seemingly proceeded with the understanding that a warrant was 
not necessary to extract [defendant's] blood." Id. 
This Court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proving exigency, 
and further highlighted its disapproval of routine warrantless blood draws by 
emphasizing that "exigency is the opposite of routine, and a reasonable belief that an 
emergency is at hand is always required if warrantless action is to be justified on the basis 
of exigent circumstances." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^  20. 
Perez-Avila asserts that the facts in the present case are strikingly similar to 
Rodriguez. Both Perez-Avila and Rodriguez were involved in a car accident which 
resulted in the death of one of the passengers (R. 228: 98). Both were subjected to 
warrantless blood-draws within a short time after the accidents (R. 228: 185-86). And 
just like Rodriguez, where the State presented no evidence that the officers had requested 
a warrant to draw the blood, there is no evidence that the officers in this case attempted to 
obtain a proper warrant to draw Perez-Avila's blood, or that the officers even 
contemplated the necessity of obtaining a warrant (R. 228:185-86). In fact, it appears 
from the record that the officers in the present case, just like the officers in Rodriguez, 
assumed that a warrant was unnecessary to draw Perez-Avila's blood (R. 228:185-86; 
229:239). 
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The State could not have met its burden of showing exigent circumstances 
sufficient to overcome the need for a warrant. There is no evidence of the officers 
attempting to obtain a warrant from a nearby magistrate or even to obtain a telephonic 
warrant. There is no evidence that Perez-Avila was attempting to flee the scene. See 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^ f 16. In fact, Perez-Avila was severely injured and 
unconscious at the hospital (R. 228: 99; 191). Moreover, while there is no specific 
timeline mentioned in the record regarding the time of the blood draw and when the 
decision to draw the blood was made, it appears from the record that the decision to take 
Perez-Avila's blood was made shortly after the accident occurred (R. 228: 185-86). 
Under these circumstances, the State could not show that the evidence would be 
destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. There was simply no showing of exigent 
circumstances overcoming the need for a warrant. 
Had trial counsel moved to suppress evidence of the warrantless blood draw, the 
trial court would have granted the motion because, for reasons stated above, the State 
could not have met its burden of establishing exigent circumstances sufficient to 
overcome the need for a warrant. Had the blood alcohol evidence been suppressed, it is 
likely that Perez-Avila would not have been convicted of any of the charges, except for 
the open container charge. The State's only sure evidence that Perez-Avila operated a 
vehicle while driving under the influence derived from the illegal blood draw. Without 
that evidence, the State could not have proven the elements of DUI or automobile 
homicide. It is also likely that the State could not have proven the two charges of child 
abuse since that verdict rested on the jury finding Perez-Avila acting with criminal 
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negligence (R. 186). If the State could not prove that Perez- Avila was operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, then it is likely it could not prove he acted 
with criminal negligence. 
Because the warrantless blood draw in this case was conducted in violation of 
Perez-Avila's right to be free from such searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule 
should bar the admission of all evidence arising from the warrantless draw of Perez-
Avila's blood. It follows that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that this deficient performance 
prejudiced Perez-Avila since he would have likely only been convicted of a class C 
misdemeanor open container violation. 
B. DUI is a Lesser Included Offense of Automobile Homicide. 
Perez-Avila asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
and subjected him to unconstitutional double jeopardy by failing to argue driving under 
the influence was a lesser-included offense of automobile homicide. Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse his conviction for driving under the influence because it merges 
with automobile homicide under the facts of this case. 
The merger doctrine has been codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and 
provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
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(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation 
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
"The prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows from the double 
jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States Constitutions." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 
236,241 (Utah App.1997); see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ("[N]or shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."); U.S. Const. Amend. V ("[Njor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). 
"Thus, we interpret section 76-1-402(3) to comply with the underlying constitutional 
guarantees against double jeopardy." Id. "Utah courts apply a two-tiered analysis to 
identify lesser-included offenses. First we determine whether the lesser offense is 
'established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged.' If the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser/ then the lesser offense 
merges into the greater crime and the State cannot convict and punish the defendant for 
both offenses." Id. (citing State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-207(2) and 41-6-44 demands that 
driving under the influence is a lesser-included offense of automobile homicide under the 
facts of this case. A person is guilty of automobile homicide if he "operates a motor 
vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and ... has a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation." Utah 
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Code Ann. § 76-5-207(3)(a)2. A person is guilty of driving under the influence if he 
operates or is in "actual physical control of a vehicle ... [and] has sufficient alcohol in the 
person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test." Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(2)(a)3. 
On the facts of this case, for Perez-Avila to be convicted of automobile homicide, 
the jury had to find that he "operated a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner/9 
"which caused the death of another human being/' and that he "had sufficient alcohol in 
his body that a subsequent chemical test showed that he had a blood alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test" or "at the time of operation 
of the vehicle" (R. 182). And for Perez-Avila to be convicted of driving under the 
influence, the jury had to find that he "operated or was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle" and "had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater" (R. 185). Once 
the jury found that Perez-Avila was guilty of automobile homicide, it could not avoid 
finding that he was driving under the influence since automobile homicide cannot be 
committed without committing driving under the influence. Accordingly, Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-1-402(3) provides that Perez-Avila cannot be convicted of both 
automobile homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol since the driving under 
2
 § 76-5-207(2) (2002) is now codified at § 76-5-207(3). 
3
 Although Perez-Avila was convicted of third-degree felony DUI, the trial court, not the jury, 
considered the prior offenses enhancing the DUI to a third-degree felony (R. 153,185). Perez-
Avila asserts that the third-degree felony DUI charge is only an enhancement penalty, not an 
element of the underlying offense and that under the facts of this case, DUI is a lesser included 
offense of automobile homicide. See State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996) 
(whether or not a charge is a second or subsequent violation is not a substantive element of the 
charged crime, but is rather a sentencing enhancement). 
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the influence charge was "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of automobile homicide. 
This Court has previously held that when trial counsel fails to request 
consolidation of charges under the merger doctrine where the law supports that 
conclusion, he or she has failed to provide effective assistance. Ross, 951 P.2d at 246; see 
also State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996). In Ross, defendant's trial 
counsel failed to request consolidation of third-degree forgery with second-degree 
communications fraud. Id. at 238. This Court observed that "[kjnowledge of the law is a 
basic prerequisite to providing competent legal assistance. If an attorney does not 
investigate clearly relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective 
assistance." Id. at 246. After concluding that third-degree forgery is a lesser included 
offense of second-degree communications fraud, this Court noted that "a reasonable 
investigation would have alerted counsel that his client might be facing double jeopardy" 
and summarily found that defendant's trial "counsel's assistance fell below an objective 
standard of professional competence." Id. 
Following the reasoning set forth in Ross, where trial counsel's performance was 
deemed ineffective for failing to request consolidation of charges, it is clear that Perez-
Avila's trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request the DUI 
charge merge with automobile homicide. But for trial counsel's deficient performance, 
Perez-Avila would not have been convicted of driving under the influence. Therefore, 
his conviction for driving under the influence should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Perez-Avila asks this Court to reverse his convictions 
for automobile homicide, second degree felonies, driving under the influence, a third 
degree felony, and child abuse, class A misdemeanors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 2004. 
Margaret P. 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
797 MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6-44 
(i) more than one prior violation within the previ-
ous ten years of any offense which, if the defendant 
were convicted, would qualify as a "conviction" as 
defined under Subsection 41-6-44(1); 
(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6-44; or 
(lii) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207. 
(2) A verification under Subsection (l)(c) may be made by: 
(a) a written indication on the citation; 
(b) a separate written document; or 
(c) any other means which the court finds adequate to 
record the law enforcement agency's verification. 
(3) (a) Prior to agreeing to a plea of guilty or no contest or 
to filing an information under Subsection (1), the prose-
cutor shall examine the criminal history or driver license 
record of the defendant. 
(b) If the defendant's record contains a conviction or 
unresolved arrest or charge for an offense listed in Sub-
sections (l)(c)(i) through (iii), a plea may only be accepted 
if: 
(i) approved by: 
(A) a district attorney; 
(B) a deputy district attorney; 
(C) a county attorney; 
(D) a deputy county attorney; 
(E) the attorney general; or 
(F) an assistant attorney general; and 
(ii) the "attorney giving approval under Subsection 
(3)(b)(i) has felony jurisdiction over the case. 
(4) A plea of guilty or no contest is not made invalid by the 
failure of the court, prosecutor, or law enforcement agency to 
comply with this section. 2004 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 1986 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or a combination of both or with specified or 
unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Mea-
surement of blood or breath alcohol — Crim-
inal punishment —Arrest without warrant — 
Penalties — Suspension or revocation of li-
cense. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview 
with a licensed mental health therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of: 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is ob-
tained at a substance abuse program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) 
and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 
62A-15-105. 
(b) (i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation 
of: 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving under Subsections 
(9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any mea-
surable controlled substance that is taken ille-
gally in the body; 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or 
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-
related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-
(G) a violation described in Subsections 
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which judgment of con-
viction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any 
other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the Umted States 
which would constitute a violation of this section 
or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-
related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered un-
der 10 U.S C. Sec. 815; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation 
described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) 
which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chap-
ter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a 
conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently 
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in 
abeyance agreement, for purposes of: 
(A) enhancement of penalties under: 
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving 
While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, and 
(II) automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207, and 
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12. 
(c) "educational series'' means an educational series 
obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved 
by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a 
person: 
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of: 
(A) an assessment; or 
(B) an educational series; and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 
62A-15-105; 
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment ob-
tained at a substance abuse program that is approved by 
the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(g) "substance abuse treatment program" means a 
state licensed substance abuse program; 
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under 
a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in com-
pliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a 
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a 
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time, of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual 
physical control; 
(iv) (A) is 21 years of age or older; £C~: 4- «l««"U r t1 +Ti£» r\a*'OfYn'o T-m^-o 
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person has a blood or breath alcohol concentra-
tion of .05 grams or greater at the time of the 
test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of operation or actual 
physical control, and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of 
a prior conviction; or 
(v) (A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration 
of .05 grams or greater at the time of operation or 
actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of operation or actual 
physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of 
a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milhHters of blood, and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 hters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a 
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at 
the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a third degree felony if the person has also 
inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proxi-
mate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also 
inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a 
jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program 
for not less than 48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Sub-
section (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-ser-
vice work program, or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assess-
ment, if it is found appropriate by a screening under 
Subsection (4)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educa-
tional series if the court does not order substance 
abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(4)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substan 
abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment TJ 
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is
 fl 
propnate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii) tl 
court may order probation for the person in
 a'C(,0 
dance with Subsection (14) 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the perse 
had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, the con 
shall order probation for the person in accordant 
with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) wit^ 
ten years of a prior conviction under this section, the con 
shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory j a 
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of 
jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work progra] 
for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through tl 
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Sul 
section (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-se 
vice work program, or home confinement, the court shal 
(l) order the person to participate in a screening 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assess 
ment, if it is found appropriate by a screening unde 
Subsection (5)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educ* 
tional series if the court does not order substanc 
abuse treatment as described under Subsectio 
(5)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substanc 
abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment pre 
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is af 
propriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person i 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is 
third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under thi 
section within ten years of two or more prior conw 
tions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5 
207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that i 
committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any convict Lon described in this Subsection (6 
which judgment of conviction is reduced under Sectioi 
76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court sus 
pends the execution of a prison sentence and places th< 
defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1>50* 
hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impost 
an order requiring the person to obtain a screening an< 
assessment and substance abuse treatment at a sub 
stance abuse treatment program providing intensive can 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervise* 
follow-through after treatment for not less than 24( 
hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsec 
tion (6)(c), if the court orders probation, the probatioi 
shall be supervised probation which may include requtf 
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the evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced 
charge as provided in Subsection (4)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (4)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant 
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found 
guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead 
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
(5) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the 
jury is required to establish the existence of the special 
mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unani-
mous vote, it shall return a verdict on the reduced charge 
as provided in Subsection (4). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special 
mitigation has not been estabhshed, it shall convict the 
defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution 
has established all the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether 
or not special mitigation has been estabhshed, the result 
is a hung jury. 
(6) (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the 
trier of fact, it shall return a special verdict indicating 
whether the existence of special mitigation has been 
found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at 
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis 
for its general verdict. 
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any 
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree 
from that offense, the elements of which the evidence has 
estabhshed beyond a reasonable doubt. 1999 
76-5-206. Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 1973 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
U) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any 
self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, 
Motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a 
negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subse-
quent chemical test shows that the person has a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
-08 grams or greater at the time of operation. 
(D) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is 
second degree felony if it is subsequent to a conviction as 
aefined in Subsection 41-6-44(1). 
te) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means 
pie negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
**e that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under 
(3\Te o r similar circumstances. 
ta) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second 
S^e felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a 
criminally negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subse-
quent chemical test shows that the person has a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation, 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negli-
gent" means criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 
76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided 
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
section. 
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration 
under this section shall be made in accordance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-44(2). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug 
is not a defense. 
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol con-
tent or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 2004 
76-5-208. Child abuse homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes child abuse homicide if 
the actor causes the death of a person under 18 years of age 
and the death results from child abuse, as defined in Subsec-
tion 76-5-109(1): 
(a) if done recklessly as provided in Subsection 76-5-
109(2)(b); 
(b) if done with criminal negligence as provided in 
Subsection 76-5-109(2)(c); or 
(c) if done with the mental culpability as provided in 
Subsection 76-5-109(3)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsection (l)(a) is 
a second degree felony. 
(3) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsections (l)(b) 
and (c) is a third degree felony. 2000 
76-5-209. Homicide by assault — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circum 
stances not amounting to aggravated murder, murT 
manslaughter, a person causes the deathj)£ 
intentionally or knowingly attempting, 
violence, to do bodily injury to *** 
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